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1       Abstract  We consider three mechanisms for the aggregation of information in het- 
2              erogeneous committees voting by Unanimity rule: Private Voting  and voting pre- 
3      ceded by either Plenary or Subgroup Deliberation. While the ﬁrst deliberation protocol 
4   imposes public communication, the second restricts communication to homogeneous 
5      subgroups. We ﬁnd that both protocols allow to Pareto improve on outcomes achieved 
6       under private  voting. Furthermore, we ﬁnd that when focusing on simple    equilib- 
7   ria under Plenary Deliberation, Subgroup Deliberation Pareto improves on outcomes 
8      achieved under Plenary Deliberation. 
 
9       JEL Classiﬁcation C72 · D71 · D72 · D74 · D82 · D83 
 
10       1 Introduction 
 
11       Most  committee  decision  making  involves  deliberation  between heterogeneously 
12     informed individuals endowed with diverging preferences. Yet the interaction between 
13  the three aspects of information heterogeneity, preference heterogeneity and commu- 
14      nication is non trivial. Heterogeneous information, in a common value setting, renders 
15    communication useful. Heterogeneity of preferences, on the other hand, makes com- 
16      munication difﬁcult to achieve. 
17 Committee communication, also called deliberation, always takes place according 
18                to some protocol which speciﬁes a set of potential receivers and senders at every 
19      moment of time. Communication may be sequential or simultaneous. It may be entirely 
20             public, if messages are observed by everyone, or it may instead be semi-public, if 
21      communication is conﬁned to Subgroups. 
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22 We examine two intuitive communication protocols in heterogeneous committees 
23             that vote under Unanimity: Plenary Deliberation and Subgroup Deliberation. Our 
24       aim is to rank these communication protocols w.r.t. simple Private Voting as well  as 
25      among each other. We proceed in two main steps, by ﬁrst isolating a set of equilibrium 
26              predictions for each protocol and then comparing these predictions as a means of 
27       comparing protocols. 
28 The ﬁrst step of our analysis is as follows. For each communication protocol   as 
29   well as for Private voting, we restrict ourselves to a class of simple equilibria and call 
30   these respectively Simple Subgroup Deliberation equilibria, Simple Plenary Deliber- 
31    ation equilibria and Simple No Deliberation Equilibria. The restrictions on strategies 
32             embedded in the term simple are mild in the case of Private Voting and in contrast 
33       signiﬁcant in the case of Subgroup and Plenary Deliberation. Within the classes   of 
34       equilibria considered, we furthermore only consider so called reactive equilibria, i.e. 
35      equilibria in which the same decision is not always made. 
36 The second step of our analysis unfolds as follows. Having isolated a (non empty) 
37      set of equilibrium predictions for each of our protocols, we ask two speciﬁc questions. 
38      First, do there always exist reactive Simple Subgroup Deliberation and reactive Simple 
39       Plenary Deliberation equilibria that are Pareto improving w.r.t. any reactive   Simple 
40      No Deliberation equilibrium? Secondly, does there always exist some reactive Simple 
41    Subgroup Deliberation equilibrium that is Pareto improving w.r.t any reactive Simple 
42       Plenary Deliberation equilibrium? Our answer to both questions is positive. The ﬁrst 
43       result reveals that the two communication protocols dominate No Deliberation in   a 
44       robust sense, given the mild restrictions imposed on strategies under Private Voting. 
45   Our second result shows that Subgroup Deliberation dominates Plenary Deliberation 
46      if one is willing to accept the signiﬁcant restrictions that we impose on strategies under 
47      Plenary Deliberation. The latter form of dominance is thus admittedly signiﬁcantly less 
48      general than the ﬁrst form of dominance established. Modulo this important caveat, we 
49  thus obtain a complete ranking of the three voting mechanisms considered: Subgroup 
50      Deliberation dominates Plenary Deliberation which itself dominates Private Voting. 
51 Among the plethora of potential communication protocols, we choose to focus 
52      on Plenary Deliberation and Subgroup Deliberation because we deem them intuitive 
53       and empirically relevant for the very reason that they are uncomplicated.    The Ple- 
54      nary Deliberation protocol is equivalent to the common practice of straw votes: Each 
55      committee member simultaneously sends a public message chosen from a binary mes- 
56   sage space. Subgroup Deliberation restricts deliberation to homogeneous Subgroups. 
57    Examples of the latter protocol abound. In parliaments or parliamentary committees, 
58      party fellows often separately consult and reach a common stance before voting. Prior 
59       to faculty meetings, professors with related research agendas may meet   separately. 
60  The key distinction between Plenary and Subgroup Deliberation resides in the a priori 
61      restriction that they place on information pooling. While Plenary Deliberation theoret- 
62   ically allows for a larger amount of information pooling than Subgroup Deliberation, 
63      our result is that Subgroup Deliberation however generates superior information shar- 
64  ing in equilibrium than Plenary Deliberation, when committees are heterogeneous. In 
65       other words, our ﬁnding is that Subgroup Deliberation a posteriori generates  more 
66       efﬁcient information sharing than Plenary Deliberation for the very reason that it  a 
67       priori restricts information sharing. 
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68       1.1 Literature review 
 
69       Early contributions in the literature on collective decision making and    information 
70  aggregation focus on Private Voting and compare different voting rules. Seminal con- 
71      tributions such as Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998), Gerardi (2000) and Duggan and 
72       Martinelli (2001) negatively single out Unanimity. Meirowitz (2002) adds a   caveat 
73              to the above. The author examines a model featuring a continuum signal space as 
74       well as (at least nearly) perfectly informative signals and ﬁnds that full  information 
75      equivalence obtains in the limit also for Unanimity. 
76 Newer contributions add a stage of cheap talk communication prior to the   vote. 
77       Gerardi and Yariv (2007) ﬁnd that if one makes imposes no restriction on the  com- 
78    munication protocol used, all non unanimous voting rules are equivalent in the sense 
79               that they induce the same set of equilibrium outcomes. Gerardi and Yariv  (2007) 
80       contrasts with most of the remaining literature on cheap talk deliberation, which has 
81       instead examined speciﬁc protocols as well as simple equilibria. Most contributions 
82      have focused on the simultaneous Plenary Deliberation protocol and the truthful delib- 
83       eration/sincere voting equilibrium (TS equilibrium). Coughlan (2000) shows that  if 
84    preferences are known and substantially heterogeneous, the TS equilibrium does not 
85       exist. Austen-Smith and Feddersen (2006) show, within a generalized version of the 
86    classical Condorcet jury model, that uncertainty about preferences can render the TS 
87       equilibrium compatible with substantial heterogeneity, provided that the voting rule 
88       is not Unanimity. Meirowitz (2007), Van  Weelden (2008) and Le Quement   (2012) 
89       add further caveats to the analysis of Austen-Smith and Feddersen (2006).   Finally, 
90      Deimen et al. (2014) show that if one considers a richer information structure featur- 
91       ing conditionally correlated signals, the TS equilibrium is compatible with a positive 
92       probability of ex post disagreement. 
93 The question of the welfare properties of different protocols and equilibria has by 
94      and large been eluded. Clearly, in a homogeneous committee, the TS equilibrum imple- 
95       ments the welfare maximizing decision rule, but little is known beyond this  insight. 
96  Doraszelski et al. (2006) study a two persons setting with heterogeneous players who 
97       communicate simultaneously before voting under Unanimity. In equilibrium,  infor- 
98       mation transmission is noisy, but communication is advantageous. Hummel   (2010) 
99  identiﬁes conditions under which Subgroup Deliberation ensures no errors in asymp- 
100       totically large and homogeneous committees. Wolinsky (2002) analyzes an    expert 
101      game and shows that a Principal can sometimes gain by strategically grouping experts 
102       into optimally sized Subgroups that pool information before reporting to him. 
103 This paper complements existing literature on four aspects. First, it examines a little 
104      studied communication protocol, Subgroup Deliberation, that constitutes an alterna- 
105  tive to Plenary Deliberation in heterogeneous committees in which types are publicly 
106      known. Second, it proposes a simple equilibrium scenario under Plenary Deliberation, 
107      for heterogeneous committees in which the TS equilibrium does not exist (so called 
108      minimally diverse committees; see Coughlan 2000). Third, it provides a ﬁrst attempt 
109       at a general clariﬁcation of the relative (Pareto) welfare properties of Private Voting, 
110      Subgroup and Plenary Deliberation. Finally, from a technical perspective, it introduces 
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112      cols in heterogeneous committees, which simply invokes a hypothetical sequence of 
113      best responses by different juror types. 
114 The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic jury model as well 
115       as the different communication protocols and equilibria that we consider. Section  3 
116       provides a positive analysis of the equilibrium sets corresponding to the   respective 
117       protocols under the imposed restrictions on strategy proﬁles. Section 4 compares the 
118       identiﬁed equilibria in terms of their Pareto welfare properties and thereby provides 
119       a tentative ranking of protocols. Section 5 concludes. Proofs are mostly relegated to 
120       Appendixes 1, 2 and 3. 
 
 
121       2 The Model 
 
122       2.1 Setup 
 
123       Suppose a jury composed of n members. A defendant is being judged and is   either 
124   guilty (G) or innocent (I ) with equal prior probability. The jury must decide whether 
125      to convict (C ) or acquit ( A) him. Each juror casts a vote in favour of either conviction 
126       or acquittal. The voting rule is Unanimity: The defendant is convicted if and only if 
127      all jurors vote for conviction. 
128 Each juror receives a single private signal prior to the vote. A signal s  ∈    {i, g} 





130       i.e. P(s = g|G) = P(s = i | I ) = p, while P(s = i |G) = P(s = g| I ) = 1 −   p. 
131      Juror signals are i.i.d. Let |g| denote the total number of g-signals received by the jury. 
132      The conditional probability P (G| |g| = k) that the defendant is guilty given |g| = k 
133       in an n persons jury is given as follows: 
 
 
134      β ( p, k, n) := 
 
135 
B( p, k, n) 
B( p, k, n) + B(1 − p, k, n) 
 





pk (1 − p)n−k . 
(1) 
 
136 For j ∈ {1 ,. . .,  n} , each jury member j ’s preferences, are determined by a com- 
137       monly known parameter q j  ∈ (0, 1) . A juror’s payoff function is given as follows: 
138  Deﬁne Uj (C | I ) = −q j  as the utility obtained by juror j when the defendant is con- 
139      victed despite being innocent, and Uj ( A|G) = −(1 − q j ) as the utility obtained when 
140   the defendant is acquitted but guilty. The utility related to remaining combinations of 
141       state and action (acquittal of an innocent or conviction of a guilty) is normalized  to 
142  0. Suppose a mechanism M yielding a probability P(C | I ) of convicting an innocent 
143       defendant and a probability P( A|G) of acquitting a guilty defendant. The expected 
144       utility of juror  j under mechanism M is given as follows: 
 
145 Uj  (M ) := − q j P(C | I )P(I ) − (1 − q j )P( A|G)P(G). (2) 
 
146 Given this utility function, a juror  j prefers conviction to acquittal whenever  his 
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148       measures the juror’s degree of aversion to wrongful conviction. The higher q j ,  the 
149       more evidence of guilt is required for juror j to prefer conviction. 
150 Juror preferences are heterogeneous and fall into two homogeneous categories. The 
151   jury contains n D doves (D) with preferences qD and n H hawks (H ) with preferences 
152      qH , where qH  < qD  and n D  + n H  = n. We assume that at least one of the two 
153      preference types is present at least twice in the committee. We refer to the allocation of 
154      committee seats among preference types as the jury composition. For each j ∈ {H, D}, 
155      we use the notation − j = {H, D}\ j . For a given type j ∈ {H, D} and total number of 
156 n, the conviction threshold T n is an integer number that satisﬁes the following: 






p, T ˜ − 1, n
. 
< q j  ≤ β 
. 





˜  ˜ 
 
158       We make the following assumptions about preferences. First, 
 
159 A.1: T n − T n :=m ≥ 2. 
D H 
 
160              In other words, in a putative equilibrium in which all n  signals would be publicly 
161     revealed before the vote, at least two signal proﬁles would cause disagreement between 
162       the different juror types. The restriction is mild. Assuming m = 1 typically imposes 
163     closely aligned preferences within the context of reasonably large committees in which 
164      many private signals are available. Second, 
 
165 A.2: T 
n j   ∈ 
.
1, . . . , n , ∀ j  ∈ {H, D} . 
 
166      This means that if jurors of a given preference type j were to decide optimally on the 
167      basis of their n j signals, they would sometimes acquit and sometimes convict. Finally, 
 
1 




169       This implies that a dove favours conviction only if the probability that the defendant 
170       is guilty exceeds 1 . This requirement matches the jury setting, where the “voir dire” 
171   selection process eliminates jurors that are excessively prone to convict. The assump- 
172      tion is used in proving our welfare results and we do not claim that it is necessary. 
173 Throughout this paper, we examine games exhibiting the following timing. In stage 
174      0, jurors receive private signals. In stage 1, jurors communicate according to an exoge- 
175  nously ﬁxed communication protocol. In stage 2, jurors simultaneously cast a vote. In 
176    stage 3, the defendant is convicted if and only if n conviction votes were cast. 
 
177      2.2 Communication protocols and equilibria 
 
178      We now introduce the three communication protocols that are the object of our analy- 
179       sis. No Deliberation (ND) simply speciﬁes that no message is sent. Plenary Deliber- 
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181      observed by all jurors. Subgroup Deliberation (SD) speciﬁes that each juror simultane- 
182      ously sends a message m ∈ {i, g} that is observed only by jurors of his preference type. 
183 Protocols are orderable according to the physical restraints that they impose on 
184  communication. The ﬁrst, No Deliberation, fully prohibits information sharing among 
185       jurors. The second, Plenary Deliberation, potentially allows for full pooling of infor- 
186   mation among all jurors. The third, Subgroup Deliberation, prohibits communication 
187      between jurors of different preference types and only allows information pooling to 
188   take place within Subgroups of homogeneous jurors. Note that under Plenary as well 
189      as Subgroup Deliberation, we assume that communication is simultaneous, i.e.  can 
190       be interpreted as simple straw votes preceding the actual vote. This is restrictive and 
191       must be distinguished from the free form communication considered in Gerardi and 
192       Yariv (2007). 
193 We introduce a set of general deﬁnitions and restrictions on strategy proﬁles. A sym- 
194      metric strategy proﬁle speciﬁes that jurors of the same preference type follow the same 
195   strategy. Monotonous strategies are s.t. information sets providing higher evidence of 
196      guilt are associated with a higher probability of voting for conviction.   Throughout 
197       the analysis, we restrict ourselves to symmetric and monotonous    strategies, in line 
198   with previous work on information aggregation and voting. We furthermore apply the 
199       follow heuristic principle. For a given protocol, we ignore the possibility of  mixing 
200      (in communication as well as in voting) as long as such a restriction does not leave us 
201  only with trivial equilibria in which the same decision (either C or A) is always made. 
202      This is true of the PD and the SD cases. It is in contrast not true under ND and we thus 
203       consider the possibility of mixed voting under the latter prococol. We now present in 
204  detail the strategy proﬁles and equilibria that our analysis focuses on. Our focus is on 
205       perfect bayesian equilibria, which we simply call equilibria in what follows. 
 
206       2.3 No deliberation 
 
207      Under ND, jurors condition their votes exclusively on their own signal. We use the term 
208      no deliberation strategy instead of the standard term private voting strategy to describe 
209      the voting behavior of jurors under this protocol. A symmetric no deliberation strategy 
210       proﬁle is characterized by a vector of mixing probabilities 
.
σ H , σ H , σ D , σ D 
. 
, where 
i g i g 
σ j 
211 s   denotes the probability that a single juror of type  j votes for conviction given   a 
212      signal s ∈ {i, g}. Let pi v j denote the event in which a given juror of preference type j 
213  is pivotal in the sense that the ﬁnal decision changes with the juror’s vote. Let γ 
j  
and 
214 I   denote the likelihood that a juror of preference type  j votes for conviction given 
215       respectively state G or I . We have 
 
γ j j j 
216 G  = pσg  + (1 − p)σi , 
γ j j j 
217 I   = (1 − p)σg  + pσi . 
 
218 Deﬁne furthermore the indicator function Y ( j, k) as follows. For  j, k  ∈ {H, D}, 
219       Y ( j, k) = 1 if j = k while Y ( j, k) = 0 otherwise. Clearly, given the Unanimity rule, 
 
 
 G γ D γ H 
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220 P(G|s, pi v j ) 
 
221 = 




.n D −Y ( j,D) . 
G 
 
.n H −Y ( j,H ) 
. 
P (s |G ) 
.
γ D 
.n D −Y ( j,D) . .n H −Y ( j,H )
+ P (s | I ) 
. .n D −Y ( j,D) . .n H −Y ( j,H ) 
H D H 
G G I I 
 
222 We call symmetric and monotonous no deliberation strategy proﬁles  simple  ND 
223      profiles (SND). If an SND proﬁle is s.t. the defendant has a positive ex ante chance of 
224      both being acquitted or convicted, we call it a reactive SND profile. If an SND proﬁle 
225       is s.t. the defendant is either always acquitted or always convicted, we call it a  non 
226      reactive SND profile. 
227  Lemma 1 Under the ND protocol, a reactive SND profile 
.
 ,σ H ,σ D ,σ D 
. 
con- 
228     stitutes an equilibrium iff, ∀ j ∈ {H, D} , ∀s ∈ {i, g}: 
i g i g 
229 P(G | s, pi v j ) = q j , when σ 
j  
∈ (0, 1) , (4) 
230 P(G | s, pi v j ) ≤ q j , when σ 
j  
= 0, (5) 
231 P(G | s, pi v j ) ≥ q j , when σ 
j  
= 1. (6) 
 
232      Proof The above conditions are standard (see for example Feddersen and Pesendorfer 
233       1998) and their proof is therefore omitted. 
234 Under the ND protocol, a reactive SND proﬁle that constitutes an equilibrium   is 
235       called a reactive SNDE. 
 
236       2.4 Plenary deliberation 
 
237                    Under the PD protocol, consider ﬁrst the strategy proﬁle in which all jurors ﬁrst 
238      truthfully reveal their signals while there is a threshold t ∈ {1,..., n} s.t. all jurors vote 
239       for conviction iff at least t g-signals have been announced. We know from Coughlan 
240       (2000) that no such strategy proﬁle constitutes an equilibrium of the game if m ≥ 1. 
241            We instead examine a strategy proﬁle that is given as follows. In Stage 1, jurors of 
242       type  j  truthfully reveal their signal while jurors of type − j  simply always    sends 
243              the message g and thus babble. In Stage 2, the voting decision of both juror types 
244       is conditioned on the number of g-signals announced by type  j . That is, there is   a 
245       t j   ∈ 
.
0, 1, . . . , n j , n j  + 1
. 
such that: (1) all jurors vote for conviction if at least t j 
246 g-signals have been announced by jurors of type j and (2) all jurors vote for acquittal 
247       otherwise. We call this strategy proﬁle a simple PD strategy profile (SPD),   thereby 
248      emphasizing the fact that one could envisage more complex strategy proﬁles  under 
249      the PD protocol, for example involving noisy communication or mixed voting.   We 
250       furthermore call an SPD proﬁle a   reactive SPD profile if t j   ∈ 
.
1, . . . , n j 
. 
, i.e. if 
251              jurors have  a positive ex ante chance of unilaterally voting for both acquittal and 
252      conviction. If an SPD strategy proﬁle is s.t. the defendant is either always  acquitted 
253   or always convicted, we call it a non reactive SPD strategy profile. 
254 Our restriction to pure strategies leaves us exclusively with equilibria in which 
255      doves truthtell while hawks babble. Truthtelling by doves appears natural given  the 
 
 
 θ i − j ,θ  
− j 
θ i − j ,θ  
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256      allocation of power across types, which unambiguously favours doves. Given a proﬁle 
257       of public information, if doves favour conviction, then hawks do so as well and will 
258      thus not veto such an outcome. If doves instead favour acquittal, they can furthermore 
259      always veto a conviction. In principle, doves can thus always get their way. The fact 
260       that hawks babble in the equilibria that we examine also appears quite natural in the 
261       light of this power allocation. As a matter of fact, we conjecture that there generally 
262       exists no symmetric and monotonic equilibrium in which an individual hawk is with 
263      positive probability pivotal at the communication stage. The argument behind    this 
264  would be as follows. Given the preference misalignment assumed between doves and 
265   hawks (m > 1), conditional on the event of being pivotal at the communication stage, 
266      a hawk favours conviction independently of his own signal. Consequently, if assumed 
267       to communicate informatively, a hawk will always favour announcing a g-signal. 
 
268      Lemma 2  Under the PD protocol, a reactive SPD profile characterized  by t j       ∈ 
269       
.
1, .., n j 
. 








p, t j − 1, n j 
. 
< q j ≤ β 
. 









q− j ≤ β 
. 




273       Proof  The double inequality (7) is necessary and sufﬁcient for a juror of type H not 
274      to have a strict incentive to deviate either at the communication or at the voting stage. 
275       The inequality (8) is necessary and sufﬁcient to ensure that preference type − j    is 
276      always willing to vote for conviction whenever at least t j guilty signals are announced 
277       by jurors of type  j . ⊓⊔ 
278 Under the PD protocol, a reactive SPD proﬁle that constitutes an equilibrium   is 
279      called a reactive SPDE. One may be uneasy with our ignoring the possibility of mixing 
280      at the voting stage. Our justiﬁcation is purely practical: Including equilibria  featur- 
281       ing mixed voting following truthtelling would be a daunting task for reasons that we 
282  explain in what follows. Recall that type j is the type that is truthelling in the commu- 
283   nication stage and consider an equilibrium featuring truthtelling followed by possibly 




describe the (possibly mixed) voting strategy of type 
285  − j, where θ s is the probability of voting C given signal s ∈ {i, g} . Symmetric mixed 
286       voting by jurors of type j requires indifference between decisions A and C at a given 




of type − j , the 
288      mixed voting strategy of type j must be summarized by a vector (t j ,θ j ) specifying 
289      the following voting behavior. When Subgroup j holds t j g-signals, each of its mem- 
290       bers votes C  with probability θ j . When Subgroup  j  holds strictly more (less) than 
291      t j  g-signals, all j -types convict (acquit). Furthermore, the conditional probability of 
292      guilt, conditional on t j g-signals in Subgroup j and on the assumption that all jurors of 
293  type − j convict, is equal to q j . In order to characterize the set of equilibria featuring 
294      truthtelling followed by possibly mixed voting, one would thus have to identify an equi- 
295      librium vector given by (t j ,θ j ,θ 
i g  ). This task is substantially more complicated 
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296      than identifying a unique threshold t j  (equivalent to (t j , 1, 1, 1)) as we do. Further- 
297      more, the increased complexity would carry over to the subsequent welfare exercise. 
 
 
298      2.5 Subgroup deliberation 
 
299      Under the SD protocol, we consider strategy proﬁles that are entirely characterized by 
300       a vector of thresholds t  = (tH , tD ). In Stage 1, jurors simultaneously truthfully dis- 
301      close their private signal to members of their Subgroup by sending a message identical 
302       to their signal. In Stage 2, all members of Subgroup  j vote for conviction if the total 
303      number of guilty messages received among members of Subgroup j is weakly larger 
304      than t j , and otherwise all vote for acquittal. We call this strategy proﬁle a simple SD 
305      profile (SSD), thereby emphasizing the fact that one could construct more  complex 
306      proﬁles under the SD protocol, for example involving noisy communication or mixing 
307       at the voting stage. We focus on SSD proﬁles that are such that the defendant has  a 
308      positive ex ante chance of both being acquitted or convicted. We call such SSD proﬁles 
309      reactive SSD profiles and these come in two subforms. A type 2 reactive SSD profile is 
310       a SSD proﬁle in which t j  ∈ 
.
1, . . . , n j 
. 
for each  j ∈ {H, D} . A type 1 reactive SSD 
311       profile is a reactive SSD proﬁle in which one Subgroup  j  ∈ {H, D} adopts t j  = 0, 
312       while Subgroup − j adopts a threshold t− j  ∈ 
.
1, . . . , n− j 
. 
. If an SSD strategy proﬁle 
313       is s.t. the defendant is either always acquitted or always convicted, we call it a  non 
314      reactive SSD strategy profile. 
315 We comment on key restrictions here. Given perfectly identical Subgroup prefer- 
316      ences, focusing on outcomes featuring truthtelling appears natural. In contrast,  one 
317      may be uneasy with our ignoring the possibility of mixing at the voting stage. Our jus- 
318      tiﬁcation is, as in the case of PD, purely practical: Including equilibria featuring mixed 
319       voting following truthtelling would be a daunting task. Symmetric mixed voting  by 
320      jurors of type j requires indifference between decisions A and C at a given information 
321       set. This implies that given a strategy of type − j  featuring truthtelling followed by 
322      (possibly mixed) voting, the mixed voting strategy of type j is summarized by a vector 
323       (t j ,θ j ), as in the case of mixed voting under PD described above. In order to char- 
324    acterize the set of equilibria featuring truthtelling followed by possibly mixed voting, 
325      one would thus have to identify an equilibrium vector given by (tH , θH , tD , θD ). This 
326       task is substantially more complicated than identifying a pair (tH , tD ) (equivalent to 
327       (tH , 1, tD , 1)) as we do. Furthermore, the increased complexity would carry over to the 
328       subsequent welfare exercise. More equilibria means more equilibria to compare, and 
329   mixed voting equilibria might not easily compare with each other or with pure voting 
330       equilibria. A ﬁnal justiﬁcation is the presumably limited impact of mixed voting  on 
331    the set of implementable decision rules. When a Subgroup j is not excessively small, 
332      truthtelling in Subgroups implies a large array of revealed Subgroup signal proﬁles, 
333    out of which no more than one could induce randomized voting, as explained. When 
334      Subgroups are large, randomization in voting by a given preference type will thus only 
335      occur rarely in any given equilibrium and is thus arguably unlikely to heavily affect 
336       the type of implementable decision rules. 
337 We now characterize conditions under which a given reactive SSD proﬁle consti- 
338      tutes an equilibrium. Let |g| j stand for the number of guilty signals held by Subgroup 
 
 . 
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339 j . Let 
.
|g| j  = t j , |g|− j  ≥ t− j 
. 
denote the event in which Subgroup  j  holds exactly 
340      t j  g -signals while Subgroup − j holds at least t− j g-signals. 
341   Lemma 3 a) Under the SD protocol, a type 2 reactive SSD profile given by (tH , tD ), 
342       where t j  ∈ 
.
1, . . . , n j 
. 





|g| j  = t j − 1, |g|− j  ≥ t− j 
. 









344 b) Under the SD protocol, a type 1 reactive SSD profile given by (tH , tD ), where 
345       for some  j ∈ {H, D}, t j  ∈ 
.
1, . . . , n j 
. 
and t− j  = 0, constitutes an equilibrium iff (9) 
346       is true and 








348       Proof  See in Appendix 1. 
 
349 Under the SD protocol, a type 1 or type 2 reactive SSD proﬁle that constitutes an 
350    equilibrium is called respectively a type 1 or type 2 reactive SSDE. 
351 The idea behind reactive SSDEs is that each homogeneous Subgroup  j  votes  as 
352       one person endowed with n j  signals. The SD protocol deﬁnes a sequential game in 
353              which individuals ﬁrst communicate in Subgroups and then vote. We  start with a 
354       discussion of Point (a). The key insight is that condition (9) simultaneously  ensures 
355      no strict deviation incentives both at the communication and at the voting stage.  As 
356              to Point (b), which characterizes type 1 reactive SSDEs, note that the behavior of 
357       Subgroup  j , as speciﬁed in (9), is the same as if it were deciding alone and  voting 
358       ex post optimally after fully pooling its information. Assuming that Subgroup    − j 
359      convicts indeed provides no indication regarding the signal proﬁle of the latter, as it 
360   always convicts. Subgroup − j , on the other hand, simply always convicts under the 
361      assumption that Subgroup j is convicting. 
362 Our analysis unfolds in two steps. Section 3 provides a descriptive analysis of 
363      reactive SND, SPD and SSD equilibria. Section 4 analyzes the comparative welfare 
364      properties of reactive SSDEs, SPDEs and SNDEs. 
 
365       3 Positive analysis 
 
366      Lemma 4 Under the ND protocol, a unique reactive SND profile constitutes an equi- 
367       librium. It is given by (σ H = 1,σ H = 1,σ D  = 1,σ D  = y), where  y  ∈ (0, 1) if 
T 
n D g i g i n D 
368 D   < n D and y = 0 if TD   = n D . 
369       Proof  See in Appendix 2. 
 
370 The unique reactive SNDE, under our restrictions, is thus one in which hawks 
371      always convict, while doves vote as if they were an independent committee   voting 
372      privately under Unanimity. The voting behavior of doves replicates the  equilibrium 
373       characterized in Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998). The key property of the  unique 
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375      imperfectly so, due to the fact that voting is private. As a ﬁnal comment, note that our 
76    assumption that m > 1 is key to eliminating a large amount of potential equilibrium 
377                scenarios under ND. When the doves are sufﬁciently biased towards acquittal (in 
378       relative terms), the assumption that all doves convict provides strong indication    of 
379    guilt and unambiguously outweighs an individual hawk’s information. 
380  Lemma 5 Under the PD protocol, a unique reactive SPD profile constitutes an equi- 
381      librium. It is characterized by tD = T 
n D . 
382       Proof  See in Appendix 2. 
383 As already mentioned, it is intuitive that there exists an equilibrium in which doves 
384       publicly reveal their information, given that Unanimity voting effectively  delegates 
385     decision power to them. This effective decision power of doves similarly explains why 
386      there is no reactive Simple Plenary Deliberation equilibrium in which hawks truthfully 
387  reveal their information. While the common feature of the unique reactive SNDE and 
388   SPDE is that hawks effectively delegate decision making to the doves, the difference 
389      between the two equilibria resides in the way doves aggregate their information. In the 
390      unique reactive SNDE, doves do not pool their information and thus always aggregate 
391     their information imperfectly if T 
n D   < n D . In the unique reactive SPDE, doves 
392   always fully pool their information, coordinate votes and aggregate their information 
393      optimally. 
394      Lemma 6  Under the SD protocol: 
395 (a) At least one reactive SSD profile constitutes an equilibrium. 
396 (b) If there exist K > 1 reactive SSDEs, then there exists a vector 
.
t 1 , t 1 
. 
s.t. the set 
H     D 
397 of SSDEs is given by: 
 







398 H , tD ,  tH − 1, tD + 1 ,...,  tH  − K + 1, tD + K − 1 . (11) 
 
399       Proof  See in Appendix 2. 
400 Here again, there always exists an equilibrium satisfying our restrictions on strate- 
401   gies. In contrast to the sets of reactive SNDEs and reactive SPDEs, the set of reactive 
402      SSDEs may however contain more than one element. Point b) shows that if there exist 
403       several reactive SSDEs, these are orderable in terms of their degree of  polarization. 
404      Among two reactive SSDEs, we say that the equilibrium with lower tH and higher tD 
405       is more  polarized, because each of the Subgroups acts more in accordance with  its 
406       own relative bias. 
407 This concludes our descriptive equilibrium analysis, given our restrictions on strat- 
408      egy proﬁles. Having identiﬁed a set of equilibrium scenarios for each protocol, we may 
409    now proceed to a welfare comparison of the identiﬁed equilibria, aimed at producing 
410      a tentative ranking of the three considered protocols. 
 
411       4 Normative analysis 
 
412      We say of an equilibrium that it is strongly Pareto dominant w.r.t. another equilibrium if 
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414   This subsection proceeds in three parts. First, Proposition 1 provides a Pareto welfare 
415      comparison of the unique reactive SPDE to the unique reactive SNDE. It establishes 
416                that the ﬁrst equilibrium either strongly Pareto dominates the latter or is outcome 
417      equivalent to it. Second, Proposition 2 shows that when the set of reactive SSDEs is 
418   not a singleton, its elements are ordered in the strong Pareto sense. Third, Proposition 
419               3 Pareto compares reactive SSDEs to the unique reactive SPDE. When the set of 
420       reactive SSDEs is not a singleton, the Pareto dominated equilibrium within this   set 
421      either strongly Pareto dominates the unique reactive SPDE or is outcome equivalent 
422      to it. When the set of reactive SSDEs is a singleton, its unique element either strongly 
423   Pareto dominates the unique reactive SPDE or is outcome equivalent to it. 
424 We add a comment on the interpretation of our theoretical exercise. Our reference 
425       to a jury setting may appear problematic because jury deliberations typically do not 
426      allow for Subgroup Deliberation. We see our analysis as a contribution to a normative 
427      debate aiming at potentially redesigning existing deliberation protocols in juries. In this 
428      perspective, considering new designs that are not in use seems legitimate. To the extent 
429      that one endorses our (admittedly restrictive) predictions for the different protocols, our 
430      welfare results would imply that members of a heterogeneous jury would unanimously 
431      agree to deliberate separately, if given the choice between Plenary Deliberation and 
432      Subgroup Deliberation. 
433 First, Jurors’ ethnic or social background does appear to be a partial predictor of 
434   their preferences. Furthermore, the ethnic or social background of a person is at least 
435      imperfectly inferable from observable attributes (physical, verbal, psychological, etc). 
 
436      Proposition 7  Reactive SPDE vs reactive SNDE. 
437 (a)  If T 
n D
 = n D , the unique reactive SPDE is outcome equivalent to the   unique 
438 reactive SNDE. 
439 (b) If T 
n D  < n D , the unique reactive SPDE is strongly Pareto dominant w.r.t the 
440 unique reactive NSDE. 
 
441       Proof  See in Appendix 3. 
 
442 As already mentioned, the unique reactive SNDE allows to optimally  aggregate 
443       the information held by doves only if T 
n D   = n D , while the unique reactive  SPDE 
444   always allows to achieve an optimal aggregation of the doves’ information. This fact 
445      is reﬂected in the distinction between cases a) and b). 
446 Our assumption that qD  > 
1  is key to showing that the unique reactive SPDE 
447     strongly Pareto dominates the unique reactive SNDE if T 
n D  < n D . If qD > 
1 , a key 
D 2 
448       aspect is that, maintaining the assumption of a unilateral conviction vote by  hawks, 
449       transiting from private voting by doves (call this the private scenario) to an optimal 
450             aggregation of pooled signals by doves (call this the pooled  scenario) leads to an 
451       increase in the ex ante probability of conviction and is thereby strictly beneﬁcial   to 
452      hawks. In the unique reactive SNDE, hawks indeed suffer from the doves’ lack of will- 
453      ingness to convict. An adjustment in the doves’ behavior that mitigates this reluctance 
454   without dramatically overshooting is thus naturally advantageous for hawks. 
455 We now expand on the reason behind the fact that our condition requires a   high 
456      enough qD . As qD increases, the probability of a unilateral conviction vote admittedly 
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457       decreases under both scenarios (private and pooled) considered above, but the   key 
458       aspect is that this probability decreases faster under the ﬁrst than under the   second 
459      scenario. In the private scenario, a unilateral conviction vote by doves requires  that 
460       every dove either receives a g-signal or, conditional on receiving an i -signal,  votes 
461      for conviction, the latter event happening with probability y( p, qD , n D ) ∈ (0, 1). For 
462   very high values of qD , y( p, qD , n D ) is however very low and furthermore tends to 
463       0 very fast as qD tends to β ( p, n D − 1, n D ). In contrast, as qD increases and tends 
464       to β ( p, n D  − 1, n D ), the likelihood of a coordinated conviction vote by doves in 
465       the pooling scenario decreases slowly and without tending to 0. It is therefore  quite 
466      intuitive that for qD large enough, transiting from the private to the pooling scenario 
467      increases the likelihood of a unilateral conviction vote by doves. 
468 Before going on to the ﬁnal step of our normative analysis, which provides a com- 
469   parison of reactive SSDEs to the unique reactive SPDE, we establish the preliminary 
470      result that the set of reactive SSDEs is fully orderable in the Pareto sense. 
471       Proposition 8  Reactive SSDEs. 
472 If (tH , tD ) , (tH − 1, tD + 1) are two reactive SSDEs, then (tH , tD ) is strongly 
473       Pareto improving w.r.t. (tH − 1, tD + 1) . 
474       Proof  Consider two reactive SSDEs (tH − 1, tD + 1) and (tH , tD ) . First, as proved in 
475       Appendix 3, transiting from (tH − 1, tD + 1) to (tH − 1, tD ) is beneﬁcial for the pref- 
476    erence type H given our assumption that m > 1. Second, transiting from (tH − 1, tD ) 
477       to (tH , tD ) is also by deﬁnition beneﬁcial to preference type  H  , given  that tH     is 
478       type  H ’s  best response to tD . An equivalent argument shows that preference  type 
479 D beneﬁts from a transition from (tH  − 1, tD + 1) to (tH , tD ). First, transiting from 
480       (tH  − 1, tD + 1) to (tH , tD + 1) is beneﬁcial for the preference type  D  given   our 
481      assumption that m  >  1. Second, going from (tH , tD + 1) to (tH , tD ) is also by 
482       deﬁnition beneﬁcial to preference type  D, given that tD  is type  D’s best   response 
483       to tH . ⊓⊔ 
484 Proposition 2 shows that if there exist multiple reactive SSDEs, then the strongly 
485                Pareto dominant equilibrium within this set is easily described: it is that in which 
486                each preference type acts the least according to its own  bias. In other words, it is 
487       the equilibrium in which the doves act harshest (have the lowest threshold tD )   and 
488       the hawks act the most leniently (have the highest threshold tH ). Reciprocally,   the 
489       strongly Pareto dominated equilibrium within this set is the one in which preference 
490      types act the most in line with their relative bias. Summarizing, as one jumps from the 
491   one to the other adjacent equilibrium within the set of reactive SSDEs, the welfare of 
492      each type increases, the less that type acts in accordance with its relative bias. 
493 We now ﬁnally compare reactive SSDEs with the unique reactive SPDE. 
494      Proposition 9  Reactive SSDEs vs reactive SPDE. 




|g|H = 0, |g|D ≥ T 
n D






496 D   ) exists and is outcome equivalent to the unique reactive SPDE. Any  other 
497 reactive SSDE is strongly Pareto dominant w.r.t. the unique reactive SPDE. 




|g|H = 0, |g|D ≥ T 
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500       Proof  See in Appendix 3. 
 
501 Proposition 3 builds on the following dynamic thought experiment: Start from the 
502      unique reactive SPDE, in which doves simply decide as if they were voting alone under 
503               Unanimity, fully pooling their information and optimally coordinating their votes 
504       according to the threshold T 
n D . Now, let hawks Subgroup Deliberate and optimally 
505  coordinate their votes under the assumption that doves convict, while doves continue 
506    to behave as in the unique reactive SPDE. There are now two possibilities, which are 
507      captured by respectively cases a) and b). 




|g|H = 0, |g|D ≥ T 




509   old tH = 0. It follows that the type 1 reactive SSD proﬁle 
.




510      tutes a reactive SSDE and is outcome equivalent to the unique reactive SPDE. In case 




|g|H = 0, |g|D ≥ T 




512    tH > 0. This adjustment is by deﬁnition strictly improving for doves as well, as hawks  
513      become more lenient w.r.t. their previous voting behavior in the unique reactive SPDE. 










515      means that the hawks’ information is decision relevant in the sense that conditional on 
516       
.
|g|H  = 0, |g|D  ≥ T 
n D 
. 
, hawks favour an acquittal. Clearly, conditional on the infor- 
517       mation set 
.
|g|H  = 0, |g|D  ≥ T 
n D 
.
, the above condition implies that a dove would 
518     agree that an acquittal is optimal. Consequently, letting doves Subgroup Deliberate and 
519      coordinate votes according to T 
n D , both types gain if hawks now Subgroup Deliberate 
520    and coordinate votes according to some optimal threshold tH > 0 instead of always 
521    convicting. Now, let us consider a next round of adjustment: Let the doves optimally 
522       readjust their threshold in the light of the threshold tH  chosen by hawks in the   pre- 
523       vious round. It is clear that doves will choose tD  ≤ T 
n D , so that this adjustment  is 
524      at least weakly favourable to both preference types. This mutual adjustment process 
525      may be continued until a ﬁxed point is reached. Such a ﬁxed point exists if there exists 
526       any reactive SSDE (and we know that there indeed exists one), and this ﬁxed  point 
527      corresponds to the most polarized reactive SSDE. Furthermore given that each step of 
528       the considered adjustment process is strongly Pareto improving, this reactive  SSDE 
529       is strongly Pareto improving w.r.t. the unique reactive SPDE. 
530 As a remark that applies to both cases a) and b) mentioned above, recall that if there 
531             exist several reactive SSDEs, we know from Proposition 2 that the most polarized 
532     reactive SSDE is strongly Pareto dominated by all remaining reactive SSDEs. It follows 
533    that if there are K > 1 reactive SSDEs, then K − 1 of these are a priori guaranteed to 
534      strongly Pareto dominate the unique reactive SPDE. 
535 We now summarize our welfare comparison of the three protocols. Four cases can 
536      be distinguished. The ﬁrst and least interesting case corresponds to T 
n D  = n D and 
 




|g|H = 0, |g|D ≥ T 
n D






538     Here, the unique reactive SPDE is outcome equivalent to the unique reactive SNDE and 
539      we furthermore cannot guarantee the existence of a reactive SSDE that strongly Pareto 
540  improves on the unique reactive SPDE. The only reactive SSDE that is guaranteed to 
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< n D  while (12) holds. Here, the unique 
543      reactive SPDE is strongly Pareto improving w.r.t. to the unique reactive SNDE and the 
544      only reactive SSDE of which we can guarantee the existence is outcome  equivalent 
545       to the unique reactive SPDE. The third case applies when T 
n D   = n D  while (12) is 
546      reversed. Here, the unique reactive SPDE is outcome equivalent to the unique reactive 
547      SNDE and we know that there exists a reactive SSDE that strongly Pareto improves 
548       on the unique reactive SPDE. 
549 The fourth and most interesting case applies when T 
n D < n D while (12) is reversed. 
550       In this case, the unique reactive SPDE is strongly Pareto improving w.r.t. the unique 
551      reactive SNDE and we know that there exists a reactive SSDE that strongly   Pareto 
552      improves on the unique reactive SPDE. We now summarize the intuition for this fourth 
553  case. One can think of the stepwise transition from ND to PD and then to SD in terms 
554       of two successive improvements. First, as compared to the unique reactive    SNDE, 
555      the unique reactive SPDE allows an improvement in the aggregation of the   doves’ 
556       information that is beneﬁcial to both preference types. Secondly, as compared to the 
557       unique reactive SPDE, reactive SSDEs also allow to use the information held by the 
558    hawks, in a way that is advantageous to both preference types. 
559 Given the above propositions, modulo our admittedly restrictive equilibrium selec- 
560       tion under the PD and SD protocols, we have thus established a complete ranking of 
561      the three protocols considered: Subgroup Deliberation dominates Plenary Delibera- 
562   tion which itself dominates Private Voting. We wish to stress that the suboptimality of 
563       the ND protocol w.r.t. the remaining two protocols is a much more robust result than 
564       the dominance of SD over PD. Recall indeed that we impose very heavy restrictions 
565       on strategy proﬁles under PD and SD. Our ranking of SD and PD thus remains very 
566      tentative. 
567 We close our analysis with two remarks on how our results potentially extend 
568     to more general settings. Our ﬁrst remark concerns the condition qD > 
1 imposed 
569       throughout. As mentioned already, the condition is key to showing that the    unique 
570    reactive SPDE strongly Pareto dominates the unique reactive SNDE if T 
n D  < n D . 
571     Now, assuming T 








, we conjecture 
D D 
572    that one can construct examples in which qD < 
1 and the following holds true: The 
573      unique reactive SPDE is not Pareto improving w.r.t. the unique reactive SNDE,   but 
574   some reactive SSDE however is. The rationale would be as follows: While the unique 
575      reactive SPDE is relatively unattractive in welfare terms, each step of the hypothetical 
576               adjustment process leading from the unique reactive SPDE to the most polarized 
577                  reactive SSDE is Pareto improving and the set of reactive SSDEs is furthermore 
578       ordered in the Pareto sense. 
 
 
579       5 Conclusion 
 
580      We set out to compare three communication protocols characterized by different phys- 
581  ical constraints on information pooling: PD, SD and ND. We identiﬁed simple condi- 
582      tions on juror preferences such that the following holds. First, the SD and PD protocols 
583       robustly dominate ND in the Pareto sense. The dominance of PD and SD w.r.t   ND 
584              relies on the fact that the identiﬁed reactive SPDE and SSDE allow for a superior 
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585      aggregation of the information held by doves, in a way that is also beneﬁcial to hawks. 
586            Second, to the extent that one focuses on a restricted class of equilibria under PD, 
587  SD furthermore dominates PD. This second result relies on the fact that the identiﬁed 
588      class of reactive SSDEs allows to also aggregate the information held by hawks. 
589 Our analysis features a number of restrictions that future research should address. 
590       A truly robust comparison of PD and SD would need to characterize the whole   set 
591      of reactive equilibria under each of the protocols, thus abandonning the    restriction 
592       to monotonous, symmetric and pure strategies. It may be that PD and SD cannot be 
593       ranked in the Pareto sense. One also ought to consider other voting rules than  Una- 
594  nimity. In the case of SD and non unanimous voting rules, we conjecture that welfare 
595      dominant equilibria involve members of the same Subgroup voting asymmetrically. 
596       In such equilibria, the number of Subgroup members voting C would increase as   a 
597      function of the number of g-signals held by the Subgroup. Another restriction of our 
598       analysis is the unrealistic assumption of only two preference types. Enlarging the set 
599   of preference types would however substantially complicate the analysis. One ﬁrst    
600   direction to explore would be to assume that any juror’s preference type is located    
601  within a neighbourhood of either of two reference values qH or qD . Finally, the binary 
602  information structure that we assume is restrictive. Our comparison of simple proto- 
603 cols ought to be repeated in a setting featuring continuous signals in order to evaluate 
604      whether our results still hold in such a more natural and versatile environment. 
 
605       Appendix 1 
 
606       Lemma 2 
 
607    Step 1 In a reactive SSDE, two types of individual deviations must be prevented.     
608  The ﬁrst type involves a deviation at the voting stage following a truthful announce- 
609    ment at the communication stage. The second type of deviation involves lying at the 
610      communication stage. 
611 Step 2 We here prove Point a), corresponding to the set of type 2 reactive SSDEs. We 
612   ﬁrst show that the condition given in Point a) is sufficient to ensure that none of the  
613    above mentioned two types of deviations is strictly advantageous to a juror of type  
614   j . Assume thus that the condition of Point a) is satisﬁed. Regarding the ﬁrst type of 
615   mentioned deviation, the threshold adopted by each Subgroup is ex post optimal at the 
616   voting stage, conditional on the locally pooled information and assuming individual 
617    pivotality, i.e. assuming that that the other Subgroup votes for conviction. We  now   
618   examine the second type of deviation. Note that misreporting a g-signal as an i -signal 
619    is either inconsequential or adversely triggers an acquittal given a Subgroup signal   
620 proﬁle where the deviating juror would have favoured a conviction. This can thus not 
621   be strictly advantageous to a juror. Instead, misreporting an i  -signal as a g-signal    
622    is always without consequence on the ﬁnal decision, as a juror can alway block a     
623 conviction triggered by his lie if he realizes that he favours acquittal, given remaining 
624       Subgroup members’ signals. 
625 We now show that the condition stated in Point a) is necessary to ensure that none 
626       of the two types of deviations mentioned in step 1 is strictly advantageous to a juror 
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627  of type j . Suppose that thus that the condition is not satisﬁed. Suppose that t j is larger 
628   than speciﬁed by the condition, given t− j . Then a juror of preference type j has a strict 
629  incentive to announce an i -signal as a g-signal and subsequently vote on the basis of 
630 the known signal proﬁle of his Subgroup and the assumption that the other Subgroup 
631   convicts. Suppose now instead that t j is smaller than speciﬁed by the condition, given 
632   t− j . Then a juror of preference type  j  has a strict incentive to announce a g-signal  
633  as an i -signal and subsequently vote on the basis of the known signal proﬁle of his   
634    Subgroup and the assumption that the other Subgroup convicts. 
635  Step 3 We now prove Point b), corresponding to the set of type 1 reactive SSDEs. The 
636  analysis of condition (9) for type j follows the exact same steps as in Point a). We now 
637 examine condition (10), which applies to the type that always convicts independently 
638  of the its Subgroup signal proﬁle. Note ﬁrst that a juror of type − j must be willing to 
639   convict no matter what signal proﬁle is revealed at the communication stage, which 
640 requires (10) to hold. This proves that (10) is necessary. We now show that condition 
641       (10) is sufficient to ensure no strict incentive to deviate for type − j . An  individual 
642       of type − j  recognizes that his announced signal is inconsequential for the   voting 
643      behavior of his Subgroup and thus has no incentive to deviate from truthtelling. As to 
644 the voting stage, conviction is always ex post optimal, assuming individual pivotality, 
645   i.e. assuming that that the other Subgroup votes for conviction. It follows that a type 
646   − j has no strict incentive to deviate at the voting stage. 
647  Step 4 In the next steps, we show that our characterization of the set of reactive   
648 SSDEs generalizes to a larger set of voting rules. Let R be the minimal number of 
649    conviction votes required for a conviction decision and assume that R > {n H , n D } . 
650     Two key aspects deserve mention. First, assuming R > {n H , n D } means that indi- 
651              vidual pivotality, either in communicating or in voting, implies that the Subgroup 
652    to which one does not belong votes for conviction. This replicates the case of Una-  
653    nimity. A second key aspect is that abandoning Unanimity implies that an individ-   
654    ual can now not single handedly veto a conviction anymore. Accordingly, deviat-    
655   ing to announcing  a  g-signal when holding an i -signal is now risky,  in the sense    
656   that one cannot simply veto an undesirable collective conviction vote triggered by    
657    such a deviation. We now show that the necessary and sufﬁcient conditions given for 
658    the case of Unanimity, whether in Point a) or Point b), extend to this more general    
659      case. 
660    Step 5 We ﬁrst look at the set of type 2 reactive SSDEs. We ﬁrst show that the con-  
661     dition of Point a) is sufficient  to ensure that none of the two types of deviations      
662 identiﬁed in step 1 is strictly advantageous. Assume thus that condition of Point a) is 
663   respected. Regarding the ﬁrst type of mentioned deviation, the threshold adopted by 
664   each Subgroup is ex post optimal at the voting stage, conditional on the locally pooled 
665   information and assuming individual pivotality, i.e. assuming that that the other Sub- 
666   group votes for conviction. We now examine the second type of deviation. Note that 
667  misreporting a g-signal as an i -signal is either inconsequential or adversely triggers 
668   an acquittal given a signal proﬁle where the deviating juror would have favoured a   
669   conviction. This can thus not be strictly advantageous to a juror. Instead, misreporting 
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671      given a signal proﬁle where the deviating juror would have favoured an acquittal. This 
672      can thus not be strictly advantageous to a juror. 
673 We now show that the condition given in Point a) is necessary to ensure that none 
674    of the two types of deviations mentioned in step 1 is strictly advantageous. Suppose 
675    thus that the condition is not satisﬁed. Suppose that t j   is larger than speciﬁed by     
676   the condition, given t− j . Then a juror of preference type  j  has a strict incentive to  
677    announce an i -signal as a g-signal and subsequently vote on the basis of the known 
678    signal proﬁle of his Subgroup and the assumption that the other Subgroup convicts. 
679    Suppose that instead t j  is smaller than speciﬁed by the condition, given t− j . Then a 
680   juror of preference type  j has a strict incentive to announce a g-signal as an i -signal 
681    and subsequently vote on the basis of the known signal proﬁle of his Subgroup and  
682      the assumption that the other Subgroup convicts. 
683 Step 6 We now examine the set of type 1 reactive SSDEs. The analysis of (9) for type 
684 j follows the exact same steps as the analysis of type 2 reactive SSDEs. The analysis 
685             of (10), corresponding to type − j , is identical to that given in step 3 and thus not 
686      repeated. 
 
687      A further lemma on reactive SSDEs 
 
688      The following lemma states in close form the existence conditions for a type 2 reactive 
689      SSDE. 
 
690       Lemma 10 SSDEs. 
691       (tH , tD ) constitutes a type 2 reactive SSDE iff, ∀  j  ∈ {H, D} , it holds that t j    ∈ 
692       
.




F ( p, q j ) + n j + K 
. 






< t j ≤ 
F ( p, q j ) + n j + K 
. 















x ≥k  B(1− p,x ,n) 
.
 
1−q .n x ≥k B( p,x ,n) 




. and K ( p, k, n) := 
1− p 
. p   . . (14) 
1− p 
 
697       Proof  Note that (tH , tD ) constitutes a type 2 reactive SSDE iff, ∀  j  ∈ {H, D} , it 
698       holds that t j  ∈ 
.
1, . . . , n j 
. 





699 n− j 
n− j 
B( p, t j − 1, n j ) x ≥t− j . 
B( p, x , n− j )
.
 ..n− j 
 
. < q j 







B( p, x , n− j ) + B(1 − p, t j − 1, n j ) x ≥t− j B(1 − p, x , n− j )  
(15) 
− j 











702       q j ≤ 
 












B( p, t j , n j ) 
703 
x ≥t− j  B( p, x , n− j ) + B(1 − p, t j , n j ) x ≥t− j  B(1 − p, x , n− j ) 
(16) 
 
704       Now, note that (15) can be rewritten as follows: 
 ⎛ 
n− j 
705 (1 − q j ) pt j −1(1 − p)n j −tj +1 ⎝ 
.
 




B( p, x , n− j )⎠ (17) 
⎞ 
706 < q j (1 − p)tj −1 pn j −tj +1 ⎝ 
.
 
x ≥t− j 
B(1 − p, x , n− j )⎠ . 
 
707 Applying the ln-transformation to both sides of (17), the above inequality can then 










     x≥t− j B(1− p,x,n− j ) ln n− j 
x ≥t− j  B( p,x ,n− j ) n j 









< t j . (18) 
 
710 One can perform a similar transformation for (16). One obtains an inequality stating 
711      that t j is weakly smaller than the LHS expression in (18) plus one. 
 
 
712       Appendix 2 
 
713      Lemma 4: reactive SNDEs 
 
714    Step 1 We  ﬁrst analyze the set of reactive SNDEs in which both preference types     
715   condition their play on their information. Note that a given preference type cannot mix 
716 after both i - and g-signals (see Condition 4). Within this subclass of equilibria, there 
717      are altogether nine possible symmetric voting proﬁles which are listed and numbered 
718    in Table 1 below. Letters x , y ∈ (0, 1) are used to denote mixing probabilities. 1 
Table 1   . 






 σ H H D D  H H D D  H H D D 
1 1, 0 1, 0 4 x , 0 1, 0 7 x , 0 1, y 
2 1, 0 x , 0 5 1, x 1, 0 8 1, x y, 0 
3 1, 0 1, x 6 x , 0 y, 0 9 1, x 1, y 
 
 p  
n D −1 
   C  
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719 We show that none of the above nine strategy proﬁles constitutes an equilibrium. 
720 Equilibrium 1 trivially never exists when m > 1. Equilibria 2,4 and 6 do not exist under 
721     the assumption that qD < β ( p, n, n) given that they require either qD = β ( p, n, n) 
722     or qH = β ( p, n, n) (recall qH < qD ). Recall in what follows that pi v j stands for the 
723    event in which a juror of preference type j is pivotal, i.e. all remaining jurors vote for 
724      conviction. Equilibria 3,7 and 9 imply (19) and (20), as given below. 
 
725 qD  = P(G|i, pi vD ) (19) 
(1 − p) 
. 
pσ D  + (1 − p)σ D 
.n D −1 . 
pσ H  + (1 − p)σ H 
.n H
 
g i g i 
726 = ⎛ ⎞ 
(1 − p) 
. 
pσ D  + (1 − p)σ D 
.n D −1 . 
pσ H  + (1 − p)σ H 
.n H
 
⎜ g i g i ⎟ ⎝    
+ p 
. 
1 − p)σ D  + pσ D 
.n D −1 .
(1 − p)σ H  + pσ H 
.n H ⎠
 
( g i g i 
(1 − p) p 
. 
pσ D  + (1 − p)σ D 
.n D −1 . 
pσ H  + (1 − p)σ H 
.n H −1
 
727 ≤ ⎛ 
g i g i 
⎞ 
(1 − p) p 
. 
pσ D  + (1 − p)σ D 
.n D −1 . 
pσ H  + (1 − p)σ H 
.n H −1
 
⎜ g i g i ⎟ ⎝ 
+ p(1 − p) 
.
(1 − p)σ D  + pσ D 
.n D −1 . 
1 − p)σ H  + pσ H 
.n H −1 ⎠
 
g i ( g i 
  pF 
1    
728 = =: P1, pF 1 + (1 − p)F 1 
p 1− p 
 
729 qH  ≥ P(G|i, pi vH ) (20) 
(1 − p) 
. 
pσ D  + (1 − p)σ D 
.n D  . 
pσ H  + (1 − p)σ H 
.n H −1
 
g i g i 
730 = ⎛ ⎞ 
(1 − p) 
. 
pσ D  + (1 − p)σ D 
.n D  . 
pσ H  + (1 − p)σ H 
.n H −1
 
⎜ g i g i ⎟ ⎝    
+ p 
. 
1 − p)σ D  + pσ D 
.n D  . 
1 − p)σ H  + pσ H 
.n H −1 ⎠
 
( g i ( g i 
(1 − p)2 
. 
pσ D  + (1 − p)σ D 
.n D −1 . 
pσ H  + (1 − p)σ H 
.n H −1
 
731 > ⎛ 
g i g i 
⎞ 
(1 − p)2 
. 
pσ D  + (1 − p)σ D 
.n D−1  . 
pσ H  + (1 − p)σ H 
.n H −1
 
⎜ g i g i ⎟ ⎝   
+ p2 
. 
1 − p)σ D  + pσ D 
.n D −1 . 
1 − p)σ H  + pσ H 
.n H −1     ⎠
 
( g i 
(1 − p)F 1 
( g i 
732 =
  p 
=: P1, 
(1 − p)F 1 + pF 1 
p 1− p 
733 where 
734 r :=(1 − r ) 
. 




σ H  + (1 − r )σ H 
.n H −1
  , r ∈ { p, (1 − p)}. 
F 1 r  g i r  g i 
 
735 Now, using the fact that for any positive constants A, B, C, D,  A 
A
B  ≤ ⇔ 
+ C +D A C 
736 B  ≤ D , note that there exists a positive integer T s.t. 
 p 
pF  1 
and 
−   2 
1− p 
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B( p, T − 1, n) 
737 
B(1 − p, T − 1, n) 
 
738 
pT −1(1 − p)n−T +1 
= 
(1 − p)T −1 pn−T +1 
B( p, T , n) 
= 
B(1 − p, T , n) 





pT (1 − p)n−T 







B( p, T , n) 




(1   p) 






pT +1(1 − p)n−T −1 
 
740 
B(1 − p, T , n) 
= 
(1 − p)T  pn−T 
≤  p ≤ 
(1 − p)F 1 (1 − p)T +1 pn−T −1 
741 = 
B( p, T + 1, n) 
B(1 − p, T + 1, n) 
. (22) 
742 Summarizing, inequalities (19) and (20) thus imply that there exists a positive 
743       integer T s.t.: 
 
744 β ( p, T − 1, n) ≤ P1 ≤ qH < qD ≤ P1 ≤ β ( p, T + 1, n) . (23) 
 
745 The inequality relation (23) however means that m ≤ 1 if equilibrium 3,7 or 9 exist. 
746 But we have assumed m > 1. As to equilibria 5 and 8, note that they imply that the 
747   following two conditions (24) and (25) hold: 
 
748 qH  = P(G|i, pi vH ) 
(1 − p) [ p]n D  
. 




749 = ⎛ ⎞ 
(1 − p) [ p]n D  
. 
pσ H  + (1 − p)σ H 
.n H −1
 
⎜ g i ⎟ ⎝ 
+ p [1 − p]n D  
. 
1 − p)σ H  + pσ H 
.n H −1 ⎠
 
( g i 
(1 − p)F 2 
750 =
  p 
=: P2, (24) 
(1 − p)F 2 + pF 2 
p 1− p 
751 qD ≤ P(G|g, pi vD ) 
[ p]n D  
. 




752 = ⎛ . 
i 
.n H ⎞ [ p]n D  pσ H + (1 − p)σ H 
g i 
⎝ 
+ [(1 − p)]n D  
. 
1 − p)σ H  + pσ H 
.n H  ⎠
 
( g i 
p [ p]n D  
. 




753 < ⎛ ⎞ 
p [ p]n D  
. 
pσ H  + (1 − p)σ H 
.n H −1
 
⎜ g i ⎟ ⎝ 
+(1 − p) [1 − p]n D  
. 
1 − p)σ H  + pσ H 
.n H −1 ⎠
 
( g i 
pF 2    
754 =
  p 
=: P2, (25) 
pF 2 + (1 − p)F 2 
p 1− p 
 
 











.n H −1 
756 r := [r ] r σg   + (1 − r )σi , r ∈ { p, (1 − p)}. 
 
757 The inequalities (24) and (25) imply that there exists a positive integer T s.t.: 
 
758 β ( p, T − 1, n) ≤ P2 = qH < qD < P2 ≤ β ( p, T + 1, n) . (26) 
 
759 Now, note that (26) means that m ≤ 1 if equilibrium 5 or 8 exists. But we have 
760 assumed m > 1. To summarize Step 1, we have now shown that none of the nine  
761 possible reactive SND voting proﬁles in which both types condition their play on their 
762    information (as listed in Table 1) ever constitutes an equilibrium. 
763 Step 2 The next steps examine the set of putative reactive SNDEs in which at least one of 
764 the two preference types plays (σg = 1, σi = 1) while the other type conditions its play 
765 on its information. Here, altogether six proﬁles need to be considered, depending on 
766 the nature of the strategy, (σg = 1, σi = 0) or (σg = 1, σi = x ) or (σg = y, σi = 0), 
767      0 < x , y  < 1, played by the preference type that conditions its play on its signal 
768       as well as on the identity of the concerned preference type. Step 3 deals with the set 
769       of putative equilibria in which the hawks condition their play on their   information 
770  while doves play (σ D = 1,σ D = 1). We show that this set is empty. Step 4 examines 
g i 
771              equilibria in which the doves condition play on their signals while the hawks play 
772      (σ H  = 1,σ H  = 1). 
g i 
773       Step 3 We here examine strategy proﬁles in which the hawks condition their play on 
774       their signal while the doves play (σ D  = 1,σ D  = 1). In such an equilibrium it must 
g i 
775       be the case that: 
 
776 P(G|i, pi vH ) ≤ qH ≤ P(G|g, pi vH ), (27) 
777 qD ≤ P(G|i, pi vD ) <  P(G|g, pi vD ). (28) 
 
778 Now, note however that: 
 
779 P(G|i, pi vH ) 
(1 − p) 
. 





(1 − p) 
. 
pσ H  + (1 − p)σ H 
.n H −1 
+ p 
. 
1 − p)σ H  + pσ H 
.n H −1
 
g i ( g i 
(1 − p)2 
. 





(1 − p)2 
. 
pσ H  + (1 − p)σ H 
.n H −1 
+ p2 
. 
1 − p)σ H  + pσ H 
.n H −1
 
g i ( g i 
(1 − p)F 3 
782 =
  p 
=: P3, (29) 
(1 − p)F 3 + pF 3 
p 1− p 
 
 
 p  
n H −1 
g 
i g i 
g i g i 
q   p 
q   p 





(1 − p) 
. 
pσ H  + (1 − p)σ H 
.n H
 
784 P(G|i, pi vD ) = . 
g i 
.n H . .n H (1 − p) pσ H + (1 − p)σ H + p  (1 − p)σ H  + pσ H 
g i g i 
(1 − p) p 
. 





(1 − p) p 
. 
pσ H  + (1 − p)σ H 
.n H −1 
+ p(1 − p) 
. 
1 − p)σ H  + pσ H 
.n H −1
 
g i ( g i 
  pF 
3    
786 = =: P3, (30) pF 3 + (1 − p)F 3 
p 1− p 
 
787      where 
 
788 r :=(1 − r ) 
. 
σ H + (1 − r )σ H 
.
 , r ∈ { p, (1 − p)}. 
F 3 r  g i 
 
789 Now, (29) and (30) imply that there exists a positive integer T s.t.: 
 
790 β ( p, T − 1, n) ≤ P3 ≤ qH < qD ≤ P3 ≤ β ( p, T + 1, n) . (31) 
 
791 This in turn means that m ≤ 1. We have however assumed m > 1. Therefore this 
792      type of equilibria does not exist. 
793      Step 4 We now examine equilibria in which the doves condition play on their signals 
794       while the hawks play (σ H  = 1,σ H  = 1) . There are a priori three such candidates. 
g i 
795      The ﬁrst candidate is the equilibrium given by (σ H  = 1,σ H  = 1,σ D = x ,σ D = 0), 
g i g i 
796      for 0 < x < 1. However, it exists iff qD = β ( p, n D , n D ), which is never true by 
797       assumption. The second candidate is the putative equilibrium A given  by (σ H       = 
798       1,σ H = 1,σ D = 1,σ D = 0). The third candidate is the putative equilibrium   B 
799       given by (σ H = 1,σ H = 1,σ D = 1,σ D = y), for 0  <  y  < 1. We  show  that 
800       either equilibrium A or B (never both) exists for any qD ∈ ((1 − p), β ( p, n D , n D )). 
801      Equilibrium A trivially exists iff β ( p, n D − 1, n D ) < qD < β ( p, n D , n D ) . As to 
802       equilibrium B, note that y satisﬁes: 
 
 
803 qD = 
(1 − p) [ p + (1 − p)y]n D −1 




804 so that, recalling explicitly the dependence of y on p, qD and n D , 
 
 
805 y ( p, qD , n D ) = 
    1  
. 
( 1−qD )(1− p) 
. 
n D −1  p − (1 − p) D 
    1  
p − 
. 
( 1−qD )(1− p) 
. 









D + p 





   
. 
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806 Now, note that y ( p, 1 − p, n D ) = 1, y ( p,β ( p, n D − 1, n D ) , n D ) = 0 and 

















    1 2 .
n D −1 










pqD ( p − 1) (qD − 1) 
 
809 × . 
1  
2 p2 − 3 p + 1 
. 
n D −1 
(n D −2) 
 
810 < 0. 
pqD 
( p − 1) (qD − 1) 
 
811     It follows that equilibrium B exists iff 1 − p < qD <β ( p, n D − 1, n D ). 
 
812      Lemma 5: reactive SPDEs 
 
813 Step 1 Suppose a reactive SPDE in which hawks trutfully reveal their signals and 
814  doves babble. We know from Lemma 3 that such an equilibrium exists iff there   
815      is a tH  ∈ {1 , . . . ,  n H } s.t. β ( p, tH − 1, n H ) < qH  ≤ β ( p, tH , n H ) and qD  ≤ 
816     β ( p, tH , n H + 1) . However, given our assumption that m > 1, there by deﬁnition 
817       exists no such tH . 
818      Step 2 Suppose now a reactive SPDE in which doves truthfully reveal their signals and 
819      hawks babble. Given our assumption on qD , there exists a (unique) t ∗ ∈ {1,..., n D } 
820    s.t. β 
. 
p, t ∗ − 1, n D 
. 
< qD ≤ β 
. 
p, t ∗ , n D 
. 
. Furthermore, we know that qH ≤ 
D D 
821     β 
. 
p, t ∗ , n D + 1
. 
given our assumption that m > 1. It follows from Lemma 3 that 
822      there exists a unique SPDE in which doves truthfully communicate while hawks bab- 
823      ble. 
 
824      Lemma 6: reactive SSDEs 
 






|g| ≥ T 
n j 
, |g| = 0 
. 
< q ≤ β 
. 
p, n , n , ∀ j ∈ {H, D} . (34) . 




827 Note that there exists a type 1 reactive SSDE given by t j  ∈ 
.
1, . . . , n j 
. 
and t− j  = 0 





p, 0, n j 
. 
< q j ≤ β 
. 





















831 Clearly, using together conditions (34) and (35), there always exists some reac- 
832 tive SSDE given our assumptions on qH and qD . Indeed, if β ( p, 0, n H ) < qH < 
833      β ( p, n H , n H ) and β ( p, 0, n D ) < qD < β ( p, n D , n D ) , then either (34) is true or 










Subgroup deliberation and voting 
 
835       prohibit the simultaneous existence of a type 1 reactive SSDE and a type 2 reactive 
836      SSDE. 
837 Note that there may exist multiple reactive SSDEs. We prove this by an example. 
838   Suppose n H  = 6, n D = 8, qH = 0.7, qD = 0.9 and p = 0.83. For these parameters, 
839  it is readily checked that there exist two type 2 reactive SSDEs given by respectively 
840       (tH  = 3, tD = 4) and (tH  = 2, tD = 5). 
841 Point b) Using the conditions given in Lemma 7 in Appendix 1, call t BR (t j ) the 
842       unique best response threshold of Subgroup i  to the threshold t j  of Subgroup  j, as 
843       deﬁned in (13). Note that either t BR (t j + 1) = t BR (t j ) or t BR (t j + 1) = t BR (t j ) − 1. 
i i i i 
844 Suppose that (k, l) constitutes a reactive SSDE. Given the behavior of t BR (tH ), only 
845 the four following threshold proﬁles may also constitute reactive SSDEs: (k −1, l +1) , 
846    (k −1, l), (k +1, l) or to (k +1, l −1). Furthermore, given the behavior of t BR (tD ), only 
847 the four following threshold proﬁles may also constitute reactive SSDEs: (k −1, l +1), 
848  (k, l + 1), (k, l − 1) or (k + 1, l − 1). Taking the intersection of the two sets, the only 
849   neighbouring points to (k, l) that may constitute reactive SSDEs are (k − 1, l + 1) or 
850   (k + 1, l − 1). Suppose ﬁnally that the two best response functions do not intersect in 
851      any of these two neighbouring points. Then, this implies that they do not intersect in 
852       any other point than (k, l). 
 
853       Appendix 3 
 
854      Proposition 1: reactive SPDE vs reactive SNDE 
 
855       Step 1 Recall that the unique reactive SPDE involves doves truthfully revealing their 
856   signal and voting according to T 
n D  while hawks babble and always convict. 
857      Step 2 Recall that there always exists a unique reactive SNDE, given by proﬁle A or B. 
858   Recall also that proﬁle A is given by (σ H  = 1,σ H  = 1,σ D = 1,σ D = 0). Suppose 
g i g i 
859      that β ( p, n D − 1, n D ) < qD < β ( p, n D , n D ) , so that equilibrium A is the unique 
860      reactive SNDE. For these parameter values, the unique reactive SNDE and the unique 
861      reactive SPDE are thus outcome equivalent. 
862       Step 3 Steps 3 to 9 are dedicated to the examination or parameter values for   which 
863  proﬁle B is the unique reactive SNDE (i.e. iff 1 − p < qD < β ( p, n D − 1, n D )). 
864      Recall that the latter equilibrium is given by (σ H  = 1,σ H  = 1,σ D  = 1,σ D  = y), 
g i g i 
865      with y ∈ (0, 1). The unique reactive SPDE is here characterized by a dove threshold 
866 D     ≤ n D  − 1. The transition from the unique reactive SNDE to the unique SPDE 
867    is clearly strictly beneﬁcial to the doves, as these are now optimally aggregating their 
868  information. In contrast, it however remains unclear whether the transition from the  
869    ﬁrst to the second equilibrium is strictly beneﬁcial to the hawks as well. If we can    
870    prove that this is the case, then we know that the unique reactive SPDE is strongly   
871    Pareto improving w.r.t   to the unique reactive SNDE, for the concerned parameter   
872      values. 
873                Step 3 All we need is thus to show that, starting from the reactive SND proﬁle B, 2 
874       allowing doves to Subgroup Deliberate while keeping the hawks’ play ﬁxed will  be 
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876    the expected payoff of preference type  j  when the doves are allowed to Subgroup   
877 Deliberate and adopt a threshold tD , while hawks always all vote for conviction as in 
878      the reactive SND proﬁle B. Let tD (qD ) be the optimal threshold adopted by the doves 
879       in these circumstances, given qD , i.e. let tD (qD ) = T 
n D . Denote by M j (qD , N D) 
880      the expected payoff of preference type  j in the reactive SND equilibrium B. Denote 
881       by  y(qD ) the mixing probability of the doves after an i -signal in the reactive  SND 
882       equilibrium B. Note that: 
 
883 W (q j , qD ) := M j (qD , SD, tD (qD )) − M j (qD , N D) (36) 
n D 
884 = −P(G) 
. 
B( p, x , n D ) [y (qD )]
n D −x (1 − q j ) 
x =0 
n D 
885 + P(I ) 
. 
B(1 − p, x , n D ) [y (qD )]n D −x q j 
x =0 




x =tD (qD ) 
n D 
B( p, x , n D )(1 − q j ) 
887 − P(I ) 
. 
 
x =tD (qD ) 
B(1 − p, x , n D )q j . (37) 
 
888       It follows that:  
1 
n D 








(B( p, x , n D ) + B(1 − p, x , n D )) [y (qD )] 
n D 




x =tD (qD ) 
(B( p, x , n D ) + B(1 − p, x , n D )) . 
891 The sign of ∂ W (q j , qD )/∂q j   is thus determined by the difference in   the total 
892 probability of conviction implied by each of the two voting scenarios considered, i.e. 
893       No Deliberation by the doves according to the symmetric voting strategy (σ D  = 1, 
894 i    = y (qD )) or Subgroup Deliberation by the doves with an optimally chosen 
895 conviction threshold tD (qD ). As the hawks’ strategy is unchanged and the doves are 
896 able to share their information when they Subgroup Deliberate, W (qD , qD ) > 0. If 
897 we can show that for all values of qD and corresponding values tD (qD ) and y(qD ), 
898 the derivative ∂ W (q j , qD )/∂q j is negative, then it is also true that W (qH , qD ) > 0, 
899    because qH < qD . Which in other words means that also the hawks beneﬁt from the 
900      change in the doves’ strategy, if they continue to apply the strategy (σ H  = 1,σ H  = 1) 
g i 
901       that they follow in the reactive SND equilibrium B. 








I (n D ) = 
n D  
+ 1 if n    is even; = 
2 
D 
n D  + 1 
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904 and for all z ∈ {I (n D ), . . . , n D } 
. 
∂ W (q j , 
1 )/∂q j for z = I (n D ) and n D uneven, 
905 W (z) := lim ∂ 2 q ,β( p, z − 1, n ) + ε
. 
/∂q otherwise. (40) 
W 
. 
j D j 
ε→0+ 
 
906 In order to show that ∂ W (q j , qD )/∂q j  is negative for all qD ∈ 
. 
1 ,β( p, n D − 1, 
907   n D )), it is enough to verify that W (z)  ≤  0, for all z  ∈  {I (n D ) , . . . ,  n D }. This  
908     is true for the two following reasons. First, stating that W (z)  ≤  0, for all z  ∈      
909   {I (n D ) , . . . ,  n D } is equivalent to stating that ∂ W (q j , qD )/∂q j   ≤ 0 for qD   =  1 
910       as well as for qD  =  lim β( p, z − 1, n D ) + ε, ∀ z ∈ {I (n D ) + 1 , . . . ,  n D }. Sec- 
ε→0+ 
911   ondly, given that y(qD ) is decreasing in qD  and given that tD (qD ) is constant for all 
912   qD ∈ (β ( p, z − 1, n D ) ,β  ( p, z, n D )], the derivative ∂ W (q j , qD )/∂q j is a decreasing 
913       function of qD for all qD ∈ (β ( p, z − 1, n D ) ,β  ( p, z, n D )]. 
914  Step 5 The proof that W (z) ≤ 0 for all z ∈ {I (n D ) , . . . ,  n D } is divided into ﬁve steps 
915  (6, 7, 8, 9 and 10). Step 6 shows that W (n D ) ≤ 0. Step 7 shows that W (I (n D )) ≤ 0, 
916  for all n D  even. Step 8 shows that W (I (n D )) ≤ 0 and W (I (n D ) + 1) ≤ 0, for all 
917 n D uneven. Step 8 shows the following. If n D is even, then if W (z) ≤ W (z + 1) , it 
918 follows that W (z + 1) ≤ W (z + 2) for all z ∈ {I (n D ), . . . ,  n D − 1}. If, in contrast, 
919 n D is uneven, then if W (z) ≤ W (z + 1) , it follows that W (z + 1) ≤ W (z + 2) for 
920  all z ∈ {I (n D ) + 1 , . . . ,  n D − 1}. Step 10, ﬁnally, shows that the four facts proven in 
921      steps 6, 7, 8 and 9 imply together that W (z) ≤ 0, for all z ∈ {I (n D ) , . . . ,  n D }. 
922       Step 6 Note the following fact: 
 
923 Fact 1 :W (n D ) < 0 whether n D is even or uneven. 
 
924 Setting z = n D , Fact 1 follows immediately from the fact that y (β ( p, n D − 1, n D )) 
925       = 0 while  lim tD (β( p, n D − 1, n D ) + ε) = n D . 
ε→0+ 
926       Step 7 Note the following fact: 
 
927 Fact 2 :W (I (n D )) < 0 if n D is even. 
 
928 Note here that β ( p, I (n D ) − 1, n D )  =  1 . Also, tD (qD )  =  I (n D ) if qD   ∈ 
( 1 
929 2 ,β  ( p, I (n D ) , n D )). For tD (qD ) = I (n D ) , the total probability of conviction, 








x =I (n D ) 
 






, n D 
.. 
.  (41) 
2 
 
932 On the other hand, for qD = 1 , the total probability of conviction in the equilibrium 










. . n D  
p 
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1 






(1− p)  n D −1 
p 
 
    1  
. 
+ 1 





n D −1 (1 − p) 
 
935 Now, note that (42) ≤ (41), for any p > 1 and n D ≥ 4. Note that given that we 
936 impose qD > 
1 , the equilibrium B does not exist if n D = 2 so that we can ignore this 
937     case. Indeed, B exists only if qD < β ( p, n D − 1, n D ) . For the case of n D = 2, this 
938     translates into qD <β ( p, 1, 2) = 1 which contradicts the assumption that qD > 1 . 
2 2 
939       Step 8 Note the following fact: 
 
940 Fact 3 :W (I (n D )) < 0 and W (I (n D ) + 1) < 0   if n D is uneven. 
 
941 We ﬁrst look at W (I (n D )). For qD  =  1  note that tD (qD ) = I (n D ) . The total 
942    probability of conviction for tD (qD ) =  I (n D ) , if doves Subgroup Deliberate and 




   
944 
2 
x =I (n D ) 
(B( p, x , n D ) + B(1 − p, x , n D )) = . (43) 
2 
 
945 On the other hand, for qD = 1 , the total probability of conviction in the equilibrium 
946       B is given by: 
 
1 






(1− p)  n D −1 
p 
 
    1  
. 
+ 1 





n D −1 (1 − p) 
 
948 We now look at W (I (n D ) + 1). Note that tD (qD ) = I (n D ) + 1 if 
 
949 qD ∈ (β ( p, I (n D ) , n D ) ,β  ( p, I (n D ) + 1, n D )) . 
 
950       The total probability of conviction for tD (qD )  =  I (n D ) + 1, if doves   Subgroup 




   
952 
2 (B( p, x , n D ) + B(1 − p, x , n D )) 
x =I (n D )+1 
1 
953 = (1 − B( p, I (n D ) , n D ) − B(1 − p, I (n D ) , n D )). (45) 
2 
 
954 On the other hand, for qD = β ( p, I (n D ) , n D ) , the total probability of conviction 









p − (1 − p) 
Subgroup deliberation and voting 
 
1 






(1− p)2   n D −1 
p2 
    1  
. 
+ 1 





n D −1  (1 − p) 
 
957 Now, note that (44) < (43) and (46) ≤ (45) , for any p ∈ ( 1 , 1] and n D ≥ 3. Note 
958   that for n D  = 1, the equilibrium B does not exist so that this case can be ignored.    
959   Indeed, B exists only if qD ≤ β ( p, 0, 1) = 1 − p if n D  = 1. But we have assumed 
960        qD  > 
1 . 
961       Step 9 Note the following fact: 
 
962 Fact 4 : If W (z + 1) − W (z) > 0 then W (z + 2) − W (z + 1) > 0, 
963 for all z ∈ {I (n D ) , . . . ,  n D − 1} if n D even, 
964 for all z ∈ {I (n D ) + 1 , . . . ,  n D − 1} if n D uneven. 
 
965 Using the Binomial Formula, for qD   =  β ( p, z − 1, n D ) , we may deﬁne  and 
966      rewrite the following new function, which we use to prove the statement: 
 
 





(B( p, x , n D )+ B(1 − p, x , n D )) 
x =0 
 
[y (β ( p, z − 1, n D ))]n D −x 
   n D . 
.. 
B(1− p,z−1,n D )(1− p) 
.
n D −1 + 1 
 
968 = 
(2 p − 1)n D 
. 
B( p,z−1,n D ) p 




. (47) . 
B(1− p,z−1,n D )(1− p) 
. 
n D −1 
B( p,z−1,n D ) p 
 
969 Note that: 
 
970 W (z + 1) − W (z) = 8 ( p, z + 1, n D ) − 8 ( p, z, n D ) (48) 




973 B( p, z − 1, n D ) + B(1 − p, z − 1, n D ) >  0, ∀ z ∈ {1 , . . . ,  n D } . (49) 
 





8 ( p, z, n D ) + 
1 
2
8 ( p, z + 2, n D ) > 8 ( p, z + 1, n D ) . (50) 
 
976   Inequality (50) follows from the fact that the function 8 ( p, z, n D ) is decreasing and 
977    convex in z over the relevant domain. The latter fact follows from the fact that the     
978       following two functions: 
 
 
 1 1 D    1 n D −1 
p − (1 − p) 
2 
2 
x ≥tH −1 
x ≥tH −1 
x ≥tH −1 
x ≥tH −1 
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. 
B(   − p, z −   , n    )(   − p)
.    n D 
 
979 f1( p, n D , z):= 
B( p, z − 1, n D ) p 




981 f2( p, n D , z):= . 
1 
    1 n D 
. (52) 
. 
B(1− p,z−1,n D )(1− p) 
. 
n D −1 
.
 
B( p,z−1,n D ) p 
 
982 are themselves decreasing and convex in z over the relevant domain. Note ﬁnally 





8 ( p, z, n D ) + 
1 
2 
8 ( p, z + 2, n D ) > 8 ( p, z + 1, n D ) (53) 
985 ⇔ 8 ( p, z + 1, n D ) − 8 ( p, z, n D ) < 8 ( p, z + 2, n D ) − 8 ( p, z + 1, n D ) . 
 
986 Using (48),(49),(50),(53) yields our statement that W (z + 2) − W (z + 1) is also 
987      positive whenever W (z + 1) − W (z) is positive. 
988 Step 10 From Facts 1,2 and 3 we know that W (z) is negative at the boundaries. From 
989  Fact 4, we know that if W(z) starts to increase it never decreases again. It follows that 
990      it has to be that W (z) ≤ 0, for all z ∈ {I (n D ) , . . . ,  n D }, whether n D is even or uneven. 
 
991 Step 11 Given that W (z) ≤ 0, for all z ∈ {I (n D ) , . . . ,  n D }, it follows by the argument 
992 given in step 4 that ∂ W (q j , qD )/∂q j ≤ 0 for all qD ∈ 
. 
1 ,β( p, n D − 1, n D )
.
, which 
993    implies that W (qH , qD )>  0 for all qH ∈ [0, qD ) and qD ∈ 
. 




994      Proposition 2: reactive SSDEs 
 
995 This complements the part of the proof of Proposition 2 that appears in the main 
996 text. We prove in what follows that transiting from (tH − 1, tD + 1) to (tH − 1, tD ) 
997 is beneﬁcial for the preference type H given our assumption that m > 1. A similar 
998 argument shows that transiting from (tH − 1, tD + 1) to (tH , tD + 1) is beneﬁcial for 







B( p, tD , n D ) 
..n H
 
B(1 − p, tD , n D ) 
..n H
 






























   qD     
≤
 
1 − qD 
 
B( p, tD  + 1, n D ) 
..n H
 




B( p, x , n H )
.
 







 x ≥tH −1 
H 














By a standard argument already used in Appendix 2, we furthermore know that by 








B( p, T − 1, n) 
< 














B(1 − p, T − 1, n) 
 
≤ 
B(1 − p, tD + 1, n D ) 
B( p, T , n) 
B(1 − p, T , n) 

















B( p, T − 2, n) 
< 
 
B( p, tD , n D ) 










B(1 − p, T − 2, n) 
 
≤ 
B(1 − p, tD , n D ) 
B( p, T − 1, n) 
B(1 − p, T − 1, n) 







Now, the inequalities (54), (55), (56) and (57) imply that there is some integer 





B( p, T − 2, n) 
B(1 − p, T − 2, n) 
< 
qH 
1 − qH 
< 
qD 
1 − qD 
B( p, T , n) 
≤ , 















Proposition 3: reactive SSDEs vs reactive SPDE 
 
Step 1 The unique reactive SPDE is characterized by a dove threshold T 




are two cases to analyze (a and b). 




|g|H = 0, |g|D ≥ T 
n D













given by tH  = 0 and tD  = T 
n D . This latter reactive SSDE is outcome equivalent   
to the unique reactive simple SPDE. If there exists any other reactive SSDE, then by 
Proposition 2, it is strongly Pareto dominant w.r.t. the reactive SSDE in which tH = 0 
and tD = T 
n D , and thus also strongly Pareto dominant w.r.t. the unique reactive SPDE. 3 
1023 




|g|H = 0, |g|D ≥ T 
n D

















reactive SSDE given by tH = 0 and tD = T 
n D . We know however from Lemma 6 that 
there exists some reactive SSDE. We now conduct an argument based on a hypothetical 
adjustment process. Start from the reactive SSD proﬁle in which tH = 0 and tD = T 
n D . 
We know that this proﬁle (although it is not an equilibrium proﬁle) yields a payoff to 
each preference type that is equivalent to that received in the unique reactive SPDE. 
Now, let hawks choose their collective best response to T 
n D , i.e. t BR (T 
n D ). We know D   . H D . 
 
1030 that the latter is strictly larger than 0 given that qH > P 
.
G .|g|H = 0, |g|D ≥ T 




This adjustment is strictly beneﬁcial to hawks and also to doves, given that hawks 
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1033 own best response t BR (t BR (T 
n D )). Again, the adjustment is by deﬁnition beneﬁcial 
1034 to doves as well as to hawks, as doves become weakly harsher. Repeat the adjustment 
 4 
 
1035 of the hawks, etc. 
  1036 This process of mutual adjustment converges to a reactive SSDE, and every  step 
  1037 of the adjustment process is strictly welfare improving for both preference types.   It 
  1038 follows that the reactive SSDE to which our adjustment process converges is strongly 
  1039 Pareto dominant w.r.t. the unique reactive SPDE. Note furthermore than any other 
  1040 reactive SSDE is less polarized than this ﬁrst reactive SSDE and thus, by Proposition 
  1041 2, strongly Pareto improving w.r.t. the latter. It follows that any reactive SSDE is 
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